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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks have recently led to significant im-
provement in many fields such as image classification and speech recog-
nition. However, these machine learning models are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples which can mislead machine learning classifiers to give in-
correct classifications. In this paper, we take advantage of reversible data
hiding to construct reversible adversarial examples which are still mis-
classified by Deep Neural Networks. Furthermore, the proposed method
can recover original images from reversible adversarial examples with no
distortion.
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1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to significant improvements
in many fields, such as image classification [1,2] and speech recognition [3]. How-
ever, the generalization properties of the DNNs have been recently questioned
because these machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples
[4]. An adversarial example is a slightly modified sample that is intended to
cause an error output of the DNN based model. In the context of classification
task, the adversarial example is crafted to force a model to classify it into a class
different from the legitimate class. In addition, adversarial examples have cross-
model generalization property [5], so the attacker can even generate adversarial
examples without the knowledge of the DNN. Adversarial attacks are divided
into two types: targeted attack and untargeted attack. In targeted attack, the
attacker generates adversarial examples which are misclassified by the classifier
into a particular class. In untargeted attack, the attacker generates adversarial
examples which are misclassified by the classifier into any class as long as it is
different from the true class.
Although generating adversarial examples to attack machine learning mod-
els is particularly horrible in systems where security or safety requirements are
strict, we can also take advantage of adversarial examples for privacy protec-
tion. For example, nowadays more and more people enjoy sharing photos on
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social networks. However, many companies are adept at analyzing the infor-
mation from photographs which are uploaded to social networks. They collect
massive amounts of data and use advanced algorithms to classify user uploaded
images and analyze users’ information. With regard to the classification process,
the most advanced algorithm is based on DNNs. In order to protect users’ pri-
vacy, we generate adversarial examples against privacy disclosure by DNNs. We
can upload adversarial examples instead of original images to social networks.
A large number of users tend to upload photographs to social networks or
cloud disks as a backup. However, the users can not get original images when
they adopt the above strategy to upload adversarial examples against privacy
disclosure by deep neural networks. Therefore, we propose reversible adversarial
examples to solve this problem. We take advantage of reversible data hiding to
embed hidden data into the adversarial example and then obtain a marked ad-
versarial example. The hidden data is the adversarial perturbation between the
original image and its adversarial example. Reversible data hiding algorithms
can recover the adversarial example without any distortion from the marked ad-
versarial example after the hidden data have been extracted [11]. In the present
paper, we refer to the marked adversarial example as reversible adversarial ex-
ample.
Our experimental results reveal that the reversible adversarial example is still
an adversarial example to the neural network, that is to say, the neural network
cannot correctly classify the reversible adversarial example. Moreover, the neu-
ral network usually provides the same incorrect classification of an adversarial
example and its reversible adversarial example. So we upload reversible adver-
sarial examples to social networks when we want to share our photographs. Our
proposed method can recover the original image from its reversible adversarial
example without any distortion. This helps to protect users’ privacy at the social
network and cloud.
2 Methods of Generating Adversarial Examples
2.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method
Goodfellow et al. [5] proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) for
generating adversarial examples. This method uses the derivative of the loss
function of the model pertaining to the input feature vector. Given the input
image X, FGSM is to perturb the gradient direction of each feature by the
gradient. Then the classification result of the input image will be changed. For
a neural network with cross-entropy cost function J(X, y) where X is the input
image and ytrue is the true class for the input image, the adversarial example is
generated as
Xadv = X + sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue)), (1)
where  is a parameter to determine the perturbation size.
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2.2 Iterative Gradient Sign Method
The Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM) is the iterative version of FGSM.
This method applies FGSM many times with small perturbation size instead of
applying adversarial noise with one large perturbation size and clipping all pixels
after each iteration to ensure that results stay in the -neighbourhood of the input
image X. We apply the l2 version of this method where the neighborhood is in
l2-norm [8]: for each iteration, the l2 version of IGSM moves in the direction of
the normalized gradient and projects the adversarial examples back on the -ball
around X until the l2 distance exceeds :
Xadv0 = X,
XadvN+1 = ProjectX,{XadvN +α
∇XJ(XadvN , ytrue)∥∥∇XJ(XadvN , ytrue)∥∥2 },
(2)
We use  ≤ 400 because such perturbations that are only perceived as a small
noise can create a large number of adversarial examples classified as an incorrect
class by the trained network. It was demonstrated that the attack of IGSM was
better than FGSM on ImageNet [9]. In our experiments, we apply the l2 version
of IGSM because this version generates lower distortion.
2.3 Deepfool
Deepfool is an untargeted attack method to generate an adversarial example
by iteratively perturbing an image [6]. This method explores the nearest decision
boundary. The image is modified a little to reach the boundary in each iteration.
The algorithm stops once the modified image changes the classification of the
network. We apply the l2 version of Deepfool.
2.4 Carlini & Wagner (C&W)
This method is named after its authors [7]. The attack can be targeted or
untargeted, and has three metrics to measure its distortion (l0, l2, l∞). The
authors point out that the untargeted l2 norm version has the best performance.
It generates adversarial examples by solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
δ
‖δ‖2 + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+δ ∈ [0, 1]n
(3)
This attack is to look for the smallest perturbation measured by l2 norm
and make the network classify the image incorrectly at the same time. c is a
hyper-parameter to balance the two parts of the equation (3). The best way to
choose c is to use the smallest value of c for which the resulting solution x + δ
has f (x+ δ) ≤ 0. f(x) is the loss function to measure the distance between the
input image and the adversarial image. f(x) is defined as:
f(x) = max(Z(x)true − max
i 6=true
{Z(x)i},−κ). (4)
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Z(x) is the pre-softmax classification result vector. κ is a hyper-parameter
called confidence. Higher confidence encourages the attack to search for adver-
sarial examples that are stronger in classification confidence. High-confidence
attacks often have larger perturbation and better transferability to other mod-
els. We set κ = 0 for C&W attack.
3 Reversible Data Hiding
Reversible data hiding (RDH) is a special type of data hiding which can
recover the original image without any distortion from the marked image and
extract the embedded hidden data. RDH algorithms are mainly divided into
three categories: compression embedding [12], difference expansion [13] and his-
togram shift [14]. RDH schemes usually construct a host sequence with small
entropy, and then embed messages via modifying the histogram [11].
Recursive Histogram Modification (RHM) [11] is a histogram modification
method for RDH. This method use the decompression and compression processes
of an entropy coder to embed the hidden data. Zhang et al. [11] prove that
RHM is an optimal coding scheme for RDH. In the present paper, we propose
to embed the adversarial perturbation into the adversarial example to generate
the reversible adversarial example with RHM.
4 Reversible Adversarial Example
We take advantage of RDH to embed hidden data into the adversarial ex-
ample and then obtain a reversible adversarial example. The embedded hidden
data is the adversarial perturbation between the original image and its adver-
sarial example. To obtain the original image back from the reversible adversarial
example, we will first use RDH algorithms to extract the adversarial perturba-
tion and recover the adversarial example without any distortion. Then we obtain
the original image by removing the adversarial perturbation from the adversarial
example. Our proposed method can recover the original image from its reversible
adversarial example with no distortion. Figure 1 demonstrates the framework of
the proposed method.
5 Experimental Results
Our experiments are performed on 10000 images randomly selected from Im-
ageNet (ILSVRC-2016) using a pretrained VGG-16 model [10] as classification
network which is evaluated with top-1 accuracy. We use original images to gener-
ate untargeted adversarial examples which the classifier misclassify into any class
as long as it is different from the true class. Adversarial examples are generated
by l2 version of IGSM, Deepfool and C&W. For IGSM, adversarial examples
are generated with different choices of . Note that these values of  are based
on assuming a range of [0, 255] per color channel of the original image. The
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Fig. 1: Framework of reversible adversarial example.
proposed reversible adversarial example method can ensure that we can recover
the original image. However, we need to verify whether the reversible adversarial
example still makes the neural network give incorrect classification.
Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate the success rate of adversarial examples and re-
versible adversarial examples causing the VGG-16 network to misclassify them.
Figure 2 illustrates that reversible adversarial examples with larger  tend to
have better ability to deceive the neural network. However, larger  also results
in larger distortion and makes it harder for the RHM algorithm to embed the
adversarial perturbation into the adversarial example. Deepfool and C&W pro-
duce low distortion with high probability to deceive the neural network when
generating adversarial examples. Therefore, fewer perturbations need to be em-
bedded and the performance of reversible adversarial examples for Deepfool and
C&W is better than IGSM.
Table 1: Success rate of adversarial examples (AE) and reversible adversarial
examples (RAE) for IGSM deceiving VGG-16
IGSM  = 100  = 200  = 300  = 400
AE 0.4845 0.7897 0.9306 0.9672
RAE 0.2839 0.6294 0.7435 0.7617
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Table 2: Success rate of adversarial examples (AE) and reversible adversarial
examples (RAE) for Deepfool and C&W deceiving VGG-16
Deepfool C&W
AE 0.9875 0.9943
RAE 0.8424 0.9577
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Fig. 2: Success rate of reversible adversarial examples for IGSM deceiving VGG-
16
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Fig. 3: (a) Original images; (b) adversarial examples; (c) reversible adversarial
examples.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a method for construction of reversible adversar-
ial examples using reversible data hiding. With the proposed method, original
images can be recovered from reversible adversarial examples without any distor-
tion. Our experiments are performed on ImageNet using VGG-16 network, which
simulates the problem of object classification in real scenarios. Experimental re-
sults reveal that reversible adversarial examples still make the neural network
give incorrect classifications. For future works, we will extend our method to
other network structures.
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